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BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF
AUGUST 11, 2011: HOW EMERGING DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGIES INTERSECT WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Erika J. Pitzel*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, people have used digital technologies to organize actions
aimed at their governments, and governments have countered by
using technology to address these popular movements. The Chinese
government has blocked access to social media1 and the use of other
personal communication devices to stop protest movements.2 When

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to the Law Review
editors for their valuable insight and suggestions.
1. Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information,
ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos).” Social Media Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Mar.
15, 2013). Some examples of social media include: blogs; social networking sites, such as Facebook and
Twitter; photo and video sharing platforms; and communication via text messages. Samantha Murphy,
Social Media: Huge, and Here to Stay, TECHNEWSDAILY (July 27, 2010, 11:59 AM),
http://www.technewsdaily.com/834-social-media-huge-and-here-to-stay.html. Social media can be
accessed through a computer or with mobile communication devices, including smartphones. Antone
Gonsalves, Social Network Use by Smartphones Jumps, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 4, 2010, 10:19 AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/hardware/handheld/social-network-use-by-smartphonesjumps/223101506. A smartphone is “a cell phone that includes additional software functions (as e-mail
or an Internet browser).” Smartphone Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/smart%20phone (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
2. In May 2011, the Chinese government shut down social media sites in response to protests by
students and citizens of Inner Mongolia. See Steven Jiang, Activists: Inner Mongolia Protests Continue,
CNN (May 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-31/world/china.mongolia.protest_1_martial-lawprotest-turnout-protests-spread?_s=PM:WORLD. In response to riots in Xinjiang in July 2009, Chinese
authorities disabled social networks, blocked Twitter and cell phone service, and censored the internet in
an effort to stop further demonstrations. See Michael Wines, In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New
Strategies to Control Flow of Information, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07
/08/world/asia/08beijing.html?scp=3&sq=Uighurs%20china%20social%20media%20shut%20down&st
=cse. In 2009, the Chinese government shut down Twitter, Flickr, Hotmail, and Live.com in anticipation
of the anniversary of Tiananmen Square protests. See Michael Wines & Andrew Jacobs, To Shut Off
Tiananmen Talk, China Disrupts Sites, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03
/world/asia/03china.html.
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Iranian protestors used Twitter3 and other social media to mobilize
and plan rallies protesting the results of the Iranian national
presidential election in 2009, Iran’s government responded by
blocking cell phone service, disrupting internet satellite service, and
filtering websites.4 In February 2011, protestors in Iran, Bahrain, and
Yemen also used social media to arrange “solidarity demonstrations,”
and again, governments responded by blocking these sites.5 In 2011,
Egypt and Syria also blocked access to cell phones and other
communication technologies to disrupt protests.6 In August 2011,
even Great Britain contemplated restricting social media to disrupt
rioting that was coordinated using these emerging communication
methods.7
3. “Twitter is a real-time information network” that can be used to “quickly share information with
people,” and can be used by anyone who has a mobile phone. About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
4. The Iranian government cut cell phone and mobile text messaging services and filtered internet
and social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook. David Folkenflik, Social Media Allows Reports
Despite Tehran’s Curbs, NPR (June 16, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1
05490051. During this 2009 event, Twitter was one of the major social media sites used by protesters to
communicate plans for additional demonstrations. See id.; Twitter Emerges as News Source During Iran
Media Crackdown, CBC NEWS (June 16, 2009, 1:02 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/20
09/06/15/iran-twitter-election-protest.html.
5. Martha Raddatz, Social Media Fuels Protests in Iran, Bahrain and Yemen, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/social-media-fuels-protests-iran-bahrain-yemen/story?id=12
926081 (describing how protestors used cell phones, smartphones, and Facebook to encourage
participation in the demonstrations).
6. In January 2011, the Egyptian government instituted an almost complete shutdown of internet
and cell phone service. Matt Richtel, Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cell Service, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/29cutoff.html. Protestors had used
these methods of communication “to organize and to spread their message.” Id. Cell phone providers
were ordered to “suspend services in selected areas.” Id. In June 2011, the Syrian government shut down
a large portion of internet services, Skype, Twitter, phone service, and Syria’s entire 3G mobile
network. Liam Stack & Katherine Zoepf, Mourning a Boy, Crowds in Syria Defy Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 11167542. Anti-government protestors used
communication tools to communicate and track ongoing demonstrations. Id.
7. Josh Halliday, David Cameron Considers Banning Suspected Rioters from Social Media,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2011, 8:01 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/11/david-cameronrioters-social-media?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487. The government, believing rioters were organized
through the use of social media, including BlackBerry Messenger, Twitter, and Facebook, contemplated
a ban on these services. Id. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, said, “Police were facing a new
circumstance where rioters were using the BlackBerry Messenger Service, a closed network, to organise
riots . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He further stated, “So we are working with the police,
the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people communicating
via these websites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Great Britain’s proposed actions were surprising because Great
Britain, unlike China, Iran, and Egypt, purports to respect free speech principles, and Great Britain’s
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In the summer of 2011, violent flash mobs8 developed in Chicago,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Milwaukee and organized largely
through the use of Twitter and Facebook.9 Authorities in each city
responded by instituting curfews but did not block access to social
media or the use of mobile communication devices.10 However, when
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) officials
learned of a planned protest at its stations set for the evening of
August 11, 2011, they decided to shut down cellular and WiFi Rail11
service to disrupt the protest.12 This event was significant: It marked
the first time a government entity in the United States disrupted a
Prime Minister had recently criticized similar governmental actions in Egypt. David D. Kirkpatrick &
Heba Afify, For Egyptians, British Riots Are a Mix of Familiar and Peculiar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2011, at A9, available at 2011 WLNR 16044914; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY
REPORTS
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES:
CHINA
24
(2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160451.pdf (stating that China’s “law provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, although the government generally did not respect these rights in
practice”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: EGYPT 12
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160456.pdf (“[Egypt’s] constitution
provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government partially restricted these
rights in practice . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: IRAN 28 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160461.pdf
(“[T]he [Iranian] government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press. There were no
basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES:
UNITED
KINGDOM
10
(2010),
available
at
ON
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160218.pdf (stating that the United Kingdom has
respected its laws providing for freedom of speech and the press “in almost all cases”).
8. Wis. State Fair Latest Target of Violent Flash Mobs, NPR (Aug. 13, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/13/139600667/wis-state-fair-latest-target-of-violent-flash-mobs (defining
flash mobs as “an instantly organized crowd, usually teenagers, bent on mayhem”).
9. See Paul Elias, Cutting off Wireless Service Seen as One Way to Stop Violent Mobs, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 16, 2011, at A13 available at 2011 WLNR 16182809 (describing the flash mobs
in these cities as violent, inflicting both physical harm and property damage). The purpose of the mobs
has “taken a criminal bent.” Chicago Flash Mobs Apparently Robbed, Attacked Four Men Over
Weekend, HUFFPOST CHI. (June 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/06/chicago-flashmobs-appare_n_871924.html.
10. See Elias, supra note 9. Philadelphia reportedly tightened youth curfews. Id. The Cleveland City
Council passed a bill that made it “illegal to use social media to organize a violent mob.” Id. The mayor
vetoed the bill. Id.
11. WiFi Rail is the wireless internet access that is provided at select BART locations. Wireless
Connections, BART, http://www.bart.gov/guide/wireless.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). A third-party
contractor manages this infrastructure. Id.
12. See Bob Franklin & Sherwood Wakeman, A Letter from BART to Our Customers, BART (Aug.
20,
2011),
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx
(detailing
BART’s
interpretation of the August 11, 2011 event). See generally BART President: Mobile Hotspots Can
Circumvent Shutdown, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
16413392 (discussing the technology involved in the August 11, 2011 BART event).
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political protest by blocking access to cell service—a tool usually
associated with nations without free-speech protections.13
Digital communication technology14 is an emerging mode of
speech that is eclipsing traditional printing press media.15 This new
“digital speech” is widespread, almost instantaneous, and mobile—
quickly spreading ideas to a wide audience,16 and the emergence of
this new mode of speech has the potential to impact the First
Amendment landscape.17 Although digital speech has provided new
means, locations, and tools for those who wish to express themselves,
the way freedom of speech applies to this emerging technology has
yet to be determined.
This Note examines whether BART officials violated the First
Amendment by shutting down mobile and WiFi Rail services to
disrupt a planned protest on August 11, 2011. Part I of this Note
reviews the events leading up to the planned protest, details the
actions of the protestors and BART officials on August 11, 2011, and
discusses the state of First Amendment law as it relates to digital
speech.18 Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s relevant freedom of
speech precedents and applies them to the events of August 11, 2011,
13. See Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse ‘Flash’ Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service. Is that Legal?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16026693 (citing a television
interview discussing the lack of prior incidents of this nature).
14. For purposes of this Note, digital communication technologies include various social media sites,
websites, and text messages available through electronic transmissions capable of being viewed or heard
on a smartphone, mobile phone, or other mobile electronic device.
15. See generally Newspapers Face a Challenging Calculus, PEW RES. CENTER (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1133/decline-print-newspapers-increased-online-news
(attributing
the
decline in print newspapers to the use of the internet).
16. “Social media is a natural sweet spot for mobile since mobile devices are at the center of how
people communicate with their circle of friends, whether by phone, text, email, or, increasingly,
accessing social networking sites via a mobile browser.” Gonsalves, supra note 1 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In 2010, over “two-thirds of the [United States] population [was] connected on cell
phones.” Chilton Tippin, Cell Phone Usage Statistics 2010, SIGNAL NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010),
http://signalnews.com/cell-phone-usage-statistics-2010. In 2010, there were 223 million mobile phone
users over the age of thirteen in the United States and 16.7 million mobile Web users. Id. Eighteen
percent of mobile devices were smartphones. Id. Cell service has “call setup success rates that are today
beyond 98% and call setup times of less than 7 seconds . . . .” Martin Sauter, Call Setup Time
Competition and LTE, WIRELESS MOVES (Nov. 21, 2010), http://mobilesociety.typepad.com/mobile_
life/2010/11/call-setup-time-competition-and-lte.html.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
18. See discussion infra Part I.
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to determine if BART’s actions were constitutional.19 In so doing,
Part II examines whether the protestors’ actions were a protected
class of speech, whether BART’s actions amounted to content
discrimination, and whether the BART stations could be considered
public forums.20 Part III asserts that current Supreme Court case law
is inadequate to address this and similar situations, suggests that the
Court evaluate digital speech based on its unique attributes, and
proposes alternate and proactive means of potential protections for
digital speech should constitutional protections fall short.21
I. THE BART CONTROVERSY
A. BART Police Actions Spur July 11, 2011 Demonstration
On July 3, 2011, BART police officers allegedly shot and killed a
transient, Charles B. Hill, who BART officials claim was armed with
a knife and bottle.22 This shooting was the latest in a series of actions
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part III. Other scholars have proposed addressing the First Amendment
concerns associated with the BART incident, flash mobs, and social media. Some authors propose
amending Supreme Court jurisprudence (remedial) while others propose legislative solutions addressing
either a larger digital subset (the internet and social media) or targeting different actors (flash mobs). For
a discussion of these other proposals, see Stephen R. Elzinga, Note, Retaliatory Forum Closure, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 539 (2012) (proposing to merge “speech-retaliation and public-forum doctrines into
an action for retaliatory forum closure”); Jacob G. Fleming, Note, The Case for a Modern Public
Forum: How the Bay Area Rapid Transit System’s Wireless Shutdown Strangled Free Speech Rights, 51
WASHBURN L.J. 631, 652–61 (2012) (proposing a modern public forum); W. Danny Green, Comment,
The First Amendment and Cell Phones: Governmental Control over Cell Phone Use on Publicly Owned
Lands, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1355 (2012) (analyzing the First Amendment issues presented in the BART
incident); Rachel Lackert, Note, BART Cell Phone Service Shutdown: Time for a Virtual Forum?, 64
FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 596–98 (2012) (proposing a virtual forum); Alexandra Paslawsky, Note, The
Growth of Social Media Norms and Governments’ Attempts at Regulation, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1485, 1491–92 (2012) (proposing that governments take internet norms into account when crafting
social media policy); Hannah Steinblatt, Note, E-Incitement: A Framework for Regulating the
Incitement of Criminal Flash Mobs, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 793 (2012)
(suggesting lawmakers draft ordinances that “directly target and penalize those who start [flash] mobs
that actually result in criminal activity” to control flash mobs); Brandon Wiebe, Comment, BART’s
Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless Censorship,
47 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 217 (2012) (arguing for a modification of the designated public forum to include
government-provided Internet access).
22. See BART Officer Suffers Cuts, Bruises Following Officer Involved Shooting, BART (July 4,
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110704.aspx; Kristin J. Bender, Rowdy Protest
Shuts Down Three BART Stations and Causes Major Delays Throughout System, OAKLAND TRIB., July
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by BART police that prompted action by the protest group “No
Justice No BART,” whose self-described mission is to raise
awareness of what it sees as police brutality by BART officials and to
ultimately disband that police force.23 No Justice No BART has
organized several demonstrations at BART stations since 200924 and
has described its protest strategy:
[T]o exercise our freedom of assembly in such a way as to
disrupt the “business as usual” status quo, and to continue
organizing such events until our demands [are] met. We will
maintain lines of communication with riders and the media, to let
people know of the potential for disruptions in service during
upcoming demonstrations, to explain our demands, and to
encourage people to join us in pressuring the BART board and
25
elected officials.

On July 11, 2011, approximately one hundred demonstrators
organized by No Justice No BART protested at three BART
stations.26 The protest was initially quiet and calm, with some
protestors handing out flyers describing their group and mission, but
the protest grew loud when some of the protestors “began screaming
11, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 13763192 (discussing the reasons for the July 11, 2011 No Justice
No BART protest); Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12; Vivian Ho, BART: Next Protests to Face
‘Zero Tolerance,’ S.F. CHRON., July 13, 2011, at C7, available at 2011 WLNR 13814149 (discussing
the genesis of July 11, 2011 protest at BART stations).
23. The group organized in January 2009 following the shooting death of Oscar Grant by a former
BART police officer at a BART station on January 1, 2009. James Fang, STATEMENT: By BART Board
President James Fang, BART (July 8, 2010), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2010/news20100708.as
px; What is “No Justice No BART”?, NO JUST. NO BART, http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2009/01/
what-is-no-justice-no-bart.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). No Justice No BART demands that “BART
disband its murderous, inept, corrupt police department.” Id.
24. According to a spokesperson for No Justice No BART, the group has held approximately twenty
to thirty demonstrations at BART stations since January 2009. E-mail from No Justice No BART to
author (Oct. 12, 2011, 18:24 EST) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review). See generally
What is No Justice No BART?, supra note 23 (discussing the history of No Justice No BART).
25. Our Strategy, NO JUST. NO BART, http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2009/01/ourstrategy.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (emphasis added).
26. The protest began at the Civic Center station (located near some of San Francisco’s major tourist
attractions) and then spread to the nearby Powell Street station and the 16th Street station (located near
the San Francisco Mission). See Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the July 11, 2011 No Justice No
BART protest); Station List, BART, http://www.bart.gov/stations/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2013)
(listing station locations).
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‘cops, pigs, murderers’ and ‘no justice, no peace, disband the BART
police,’ [while standing] on the platform.”27 Some protestors then
blocked train doors, and one man climbed on top of a train.28 BART
closed the station within thirty minutes.29 Some protestors then rode
trains to two other stations forcing BART officials to close those
stations as well.30 However, the demonstrations did not result in any
injuries or arrests.31
A No Justice No BART organizer viewed the protest as a success
since it was “disruptive but peaceful.”32 The event, which occurred
during the evening rush hour, affected transit schedules for three
hours;33 however, the average train delay during the protest was
seven minutes.34 BART closed the Civic Center station for thirty
minutes and locked turnstiles at the Powell Street station for twenty
minutes.35 BART officials responded to the July 11 protest by
increasing the visible police presence at the stations, temporarily
closing affected stations, and moving crowds away from the trains.36
BART officials, irritated by the system-wide delays and safety
hazards caused by protesters on crowded platforms near high-speed
trains, stated that there would be “zero tolerance” for these kinds of
protests in the future.37
B. August 11, 2011 Protest
On August 11, 2011, No Justice No BART again planned to
protest at BART stations during the evening commute.38 According
to official statements, BART personnel learned of the planned protest
27. Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the No Justice No BART protests on July 11, 2011).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Ho, supra note 22.
31. Bender, supra note 22.
32. Ho, supra note 22 (reporting what a protest organizer thought of the demonstrations).
33. Bender, supra note 22. BART “carries 190,000 passengers during the morning and evening
commutes every day.” Protests in San Francisco Go on Without New Wireless Shutdowns, HONOLULU
STAR-ADVERTISER, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16356150.
34. Ho, supra note 22.
35. Bender, supra note 22.
36. Id.
37. See Ho, supra note 22.
38. See Jonsson, supra note 13.
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on the organizer’s website, which publicly posted the organization’s
plans to hold a protest at one of the stations beginning at 4:30 p.m.39
The website stated the organizers planned to use cell phones once on
BART property to further coordinate the protest.40 In response,
BART officials decided to cut cell phone and WiFi Rail service at the
potentially affected subway stations just prior to the time of the
planned protest.41 BART officially stated that it used these tactics to
“ensure the safety of everyone on the platform.”42 However, internal
BART communications suggest that BART officials’ decision to shut
down cell service was hastily planned with little discussion of the
consequences.43 No Justice No BART also questioned BART’s
motives, suggesting BART’s tactics were not aimed at safety but at
disrupting their protest message.44 BART’s strategy was successful,
and the protest never materialized.45 BART restored cell service by
7:00 p.m.46
39. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, NBC BAY AREA (Aug. 11, 2011, 3:18 PM),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/BART-Protest-Could-Impact-Evening-Commute127554708.html; Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
40. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that the protestors planned to communicate while at
different stations and text the location of BART authorities to each other).
41. Id.; Statement on Temporary Wireless Service Interruption in Select BART Stations on Aug. 11,
BART (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110812.aspx [hereinafter
Statement]; see also BART President: Mobile Hotspots Can Circumvent Shutdown, supra note 12
(describing plans to shut down the WiFi Rail system).
42. Statement, supra note 41. BART officials cited safety concerns regarding potential falls from
overcrowded platforms onto the trackway that contains an electrified third rail and is located five feet
below the platforms. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. BART’s deputy police chief, Benson Fairow,
stated that “he decided to switch off the service out of concern that protesters on station platforms could
clash with commuters, create panicked surges of passengers, and put themselves or others in the way of
speeding trains or the high-voltage third rails. ‘It was a recipe for disaster’ . . . .” Michael Cabanatuan,
BART Admits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/BART-admits-halting-cell-service-to-stop-protests-2335114.php;
see also Fleming, supra note 21, at 635 n.24.
43. Zusha Elinson, BART Cut Cell Service on Spur of the Moment, Emails Show, BAY CITIZEN (S.F.)
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.baycitizen.org/bart-protests/story/bart-cut-cell-service-spur-moment-emails/
(“The discussion of the idea lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.”); see also Jennifer Spencer, Note, No
Service: Free Speech, the Communications Act, and BART’s Cell Phone Network Shutdown, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 767, 769, 771 (2012) (discussing BART’s internal communications regarding the
cell phone shutdown).
44. See Response to BART’s Illegal Blackout of Phone Service, NO JUST. NO BART,
http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2011/08/our-statement-on-network-blackout-on.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013).
45. Elias, supra note 9; Jonsson, supra note 13.
46. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
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BART accomplished the cell phone shutdown by cutting power to
the station’s underground nodes that relay cell service to above
ground transmitters.47 The subterranean platform levels and some of
the concourse levels of the affected stations lost cell service.48 BART
owns the underground nodes and rents them to various cellular
providers.49 BART notified the cell providers prior to cutting the
power.50
C. Jurisdiction And Governing Laws
BART is a California “public agency” that was chartered by the
California legislature in 1957 and is governed by California’s Public
Utility Code.51 BART has an anti-demonstration policy: “No person
47. Robert Barnes, A First Amendment Collision on the San Francisco Subway, WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 2011, at A13, available at 2011 WLNR 17064798; see also Elias, supra note 9; Franklin &
Wakeman, supra note 12.
48. Passengers at street level and aboveground stations continued to have cell reception because
outside signals could reach those areas. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
49. See Barnes, supra note 47. BART began providing cell phone coverage at their stations through
a contract with local wireless carriers in 2005. See generally Michael Cabanatuan, Underground, but
Not Unconnected—BART Offers Wireless Service to Riders, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 19, 2005, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Underground-but-not-unconnected-BART-offers-2594271.php
(discussing BART’s wireless coverage); Wireless Connections, supra note 11 (describing mobile
technologies at BART stations).
50. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. Linton Johnson, a BART spokesman, said shutting off
underground cell service is “allowable under an agreement with several major phone service providers
that pay rent to BART.” Rachel Gordon et al., Protests Shut BART Stations in S.F.—This Time the Cell
Phones Stay on, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 16177189. BART cut
power to the nodes rather than jamming the signal. Jonsson, supra note 13. “A jammer can block all
radio communications on any device that operates on radio frequencies within its range (i.e., within a
certain radius of the jammer) by emitting radio frequency waves that prevent the targeted device from
establishing or maintaining a connection.” GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell Phone Jammers: Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), FCC.GOV, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013). Jamming cell phone signals is illegal under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because
it transmits radio waves that interfere with authorized radio communications. 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006)
(“No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio
communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or operated by the United
States Government.”).
51. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 28509, 28600 (West 2011); A History of BART: The Concept Is
Born, BART, http://www.bart.gov/about/history/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). Section 28600 of
the California Utility Code created the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District. PUB. UTIL.
§ 28600. The Code defines “district” as “a transit district formed under this part.” Id. § 24503. BART is
also considered a “public agency.” See id. §§ 207, 24503, 28509. A “‘[p]ublic agency’ includes a city,
city and county, a county, the State of California, or any public district organized under the laws of the
State of California or any agency or authority of any thereof.” Id. § 24509. The state code also
authorizes the creation of BART’s police department and defines their power and authority under the
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shall conduct or participate in assemblies or demonstrations or
engage in other expressive activities in the paid areas of BART
stations, including BART cars and trains and BART station
platforms.”52 However, “expressive activities” are allowed in certain
designated areas.53 California regulations also allow the transit
authority to impose a penalty for “[w]illfully disturbing others on or
in a system facility or vehicle by engaging in boisterous or unruly
behavior . . . ; [and] willfully blocking the free movement of another
person in a system facility or vehicle.”54 Even if BART officials
complied with BART and state policies and regulations when
shutting down cell service, their actions still may have resulted in a
violation of First Amendment rights.
D. First Amendment History
The First Amendment provides for “freedom of speech.”55 In its
decisions during the past century, the Supreme Court has attempted
to delineate the limits of free speech56 but, in the process, has created
state’s Penal Code. Id. § 28767.5.
52. Statement, supra note 41.
53. Id.
54. PUB. UTIL. § 99580.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. There are five clauses in the First Amendment, each with their own line
of Supreme Court interpretation, but this Note focuses only on freedom of speech issues.
56. In 1925, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment can be applied to the states through
application of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, few Supreme Court decisions regarding free speech
issues further defined the doctrine until World War I. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States.”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (3d ed. 2010); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 763 (17th ed. 2010). Around that time, the Court generally
heard political speech cases related to socialism, overthrowing the government, or resisting the war. See
generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (discussing whether the Syndicalism Act violated the right of freedom of speech); Gitlow,
268 U.S. at 670 (discussing whether a statute prohibiting criminal anarchy violated defendant’s right to
freedom of speech); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (discussing whether a person’s
conviction under the Espionage Act violated his right to freedom of speech); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (discussing whether the Espionage Act is unconstitutional because it is in
conflict with the First Amendment). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court began expanding the
definition of what constitutes protected speech. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(providing a new test of what constitutes obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969)
(holding that Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment and articulating a new
standard for incitement); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (expanding upon what First
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“an endless maze” of tests and definitions to assess what constitutes
protected speech.57 Although First Amendment doctrine expanded in
the twentieth century,58 there is little Supreme Court case law
regarding free speech rights relating to digital communications and
no precedent regarding termination of cell service to disrupt the
organization of a protest.59 Communication methods have evolved
over time from the printing press to the digital age, but First
Amendment jurisprudence has not kept pace. Therefore, the events of
August 11, 2011 must be analyzed under existing First Amendment
tests.60
E. Implicated First Amendment Principles
1. Protected Classes of Speech
The initial inquiry in First Amendment analysis is to determine
whether the speech is protected speech or is unprotected, “low value”
speech.61 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,62 the Supreme Court said
Amendment protections are afforded to libelous speech); FARBER, supra, at 12.
57. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First Amendment
Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 55 (1997) (“First Amendment jurisprudence has been described as
‘an endless maze’ with ‘no general framework.’”); see also FARBER, supra note 56, at 11–12;
58. See cases cited supra note 56.
59. Only a few cases regarding regulation of internet content have reached the Supreme Court. Some
of these include: Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (holding the Child Online Protection Act
violated the First Amendment by burdening adults’ access to some protected speech); United States v.
Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003) (holding the Children’s Internet Protection Act did
not violate freedom of speech); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding the Communications
Decency Act was a content-based speech restriction and was facially overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment).
60. See Hudson, supra note 57, at 57 (discussing the three primary First Amendment principles:
categorization of the type of speech involved; determination of the type of forum; and analysis of
content discrimination). It has been suggested that the public forum doctrine is the only applicable First
Amendment test to apply to the BART situation. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 648–49. However, this
Note argues that the emergence and unique characteristics of digital technology, particularly as applied
to the BART incident, make the analysis of each of the three primary First Amendment principles
relevant.
61. FARBER, supra note 56, at 14 (stating the first step in a First Amendment analysis is determining
if the speech is within an “unprotected category of speech”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1984) (opining that defining the type of
speech is an important first inquiry in a content-based analysis because “low” value speech is “deserving
of only limited constitutional protection”).
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
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freedom of speech is not an absolute right.63 There are some classes
of speech that are not constitutionally protected64 because the
benefits of the speech are “clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.”65
One type of unprotected speech is speech that incites a breach of
the peace.66 In Schenck v. United States,67 the Court clarified that to
be lawfully censored, inciting speech must pose a “clear and present”
danger to society.68 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,69 the Court redefined
the clear and present danger test to its modern form—the
Brandenburg test: a clear and present danger is posed, justifying
suppression of speech, when the speech advocating “use of force or
of law violation . . . is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”70
63. Id. (“[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
64. Id. at 571–72. The Supreme Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.
Id. Through case law, the Court has expanded what constitutes unprotected, low value classes of speech
to include: incitement, obscenity, fraud, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, speech integral
to criminal conduct, commercial speech, and true threats. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,
1584 (2010); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (commercial speech);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 565 (fighting
words).
65. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
66. Id.
67. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
68. Id. at 52 (stating that when determining if speech is unprotected, “proximity and degree,” and
whether the speech is “used in such circumstances and . . . such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” are the critical
inquiries). The Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513–14 (1951), applied a refined version
of the clear and present danger test in upholding the Smith Act. The Court’s revised test was “whether
the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510.
69. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969) (evaluating the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader
who violated an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute).
70. Id. at 447–49 (holding a statute was unconstitutional because it did not distinguish between
“mere advocacy” and “incitement to imminent lawless action”). Since Brandenburg, there have been
few Supreme Court decisions expanding upon the meaning of the Brandenburg test. See Marc Rohr,
Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 10 (2002) (discussing the lack of Supreme Court decisions
clarifying the Brandenburg test). However, in one such case, Hess v. Indiana, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it was not enough that speech had a “tendency to lead to violence” but required that the
speech be “intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.” Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
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Although Chaplinsky articulated the general principle that certain
categories of unprotected speech were outside the scope of First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court later held that low value
speech may receive protection in certain circumstances.71 In R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,72 the Court stated that even restrictions on low value
speech must not be based on content-based distinctions.73
2. Content-Based Discrimination
Another increasingly important freedom of speech consideration is
whether the government action or regulation is content-based or
content-neutral.74 This is a crucial inquiry75 because there is a strong
presumption that a content-based law is invalid.76 “[A]bove all else,
105, 108–09 (1973) (overturning the conviction since his words “amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”). In Hess, an anti-war demonstrator was
convicted of disorderly conduct. Id. at 105–07. During the demonstration, the police ordered the crowd
of approximately one hundred demonstrators to clear the street. Id. at 106. When the police passed Hess,
he exclaimed, “We’ll take the fucking street later,” or “We’ll take the fucking street again.” Id. at 107.
71. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 62 (2000) (stating that contentbased restrictions on unprotected categories of speech receive strict scrutiny and are the exception to the
general rule that unprotected speech receives rational basis review).
72. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
73. Id. at 383–84 (stating that unprotected speech can be “regulated because of their constitutionally
proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely
invisible to the Constitution”).
74. See Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 53 (“Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the
application of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) (“[T]he Court almost invariably reaches
the same result—content-based restrictions of ‘high value’ speech are unconstitutional.”); Stone, supra
note 61, at 196 (stating that but for a few exceptions, “the Court has invalidated almost every contentbased restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century”).
75. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”).
76. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (holding “content-based regulations are presumptively invalid”).
However, there are some instances dealing with public forum issues where the Court has upheld
government regulations. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538–39
(1980) (discussing Greer v. Spock and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 840 (1976) (holding that the government may regulate speech at a military base if that speech
would disrupt the property’s legitimate governmental purpose); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding that a public transit system that rented out advertising space on its buses
did not have to accept partisan political advertising). Another exception to the general principle that
content-based laws are presumptively invalid is described by the secondary effects doctrine: a regulation
that appears on its face to discriminate based on content is not deemed to be content-based if the
regulation is targeted towards the “secondary effects” of that speech. See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46, 47, 60 n.4 (1986) (discussing the secondary effects of an adult theater
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the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”77 A government law is generally deemed content-based if it
is restricted because of its subject matter or viewpoint.78 Contentneutral laws are those made “without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.”79 If a government restriction is content-based, it
receives strict scrutiny: the government action must be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling state interest.80 In contrast,81 contentneutral laws are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny.82
The government may place reasonable83 time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech, so long as the regulations are content-

location, such as increased crime, and stating that under the secondary effects doctrine, the level of
scrutiny is the same as that for content-neutral laws: the restriction must be narrowly tailored, designed
to serve a substantial governmental interest, and allow for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that if picketing regulations had been
justified by concerns about congestion, interference with ingress or egress, visual clutter, or security, the
secondary effects doctrine may have applied).
77. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989) (stating the “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable”).
78. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (declaring that subject matter regulation is contentbased discrimination); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643 (stating that content-based laws make
distinctions based on the ideas or views expressed); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 537 (stating that
restrictions against “public discussion of an entire topic” as well as viewpoint constitute content-based
discrimination); see also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93, 95, 99 (overturning a Chicago ordinance that
prohibited picketing within 100 feet of a school but had an exception for peaceful picketing in
connection with a labor dispute because the ordinance described permissible picketing in terms of its
subject matter).
79. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48.
80. For a discussion of the level of scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions of speech, see
Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 543–44 (“Mere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling
state interest.”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
395–96 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118, 123 (1991).
81. For a discussion of one theory explaining why there are different standards for content-based and
content-neutral laws, see Stone, supra note 74, at 54.
82. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642; see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189
(1997) (“[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained . . . if it advances important governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further those interests.”).
83. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (commenting that reasonableness
is based on “[t]he nature of a place, [and] the pattern of its normal activities,” and the essential inquiry is
“whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time”).
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neutral.84 These restrictions must be based on legitimate government
interests, such as regulating traffic and securing public order.85
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions must also be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, be narrowly
tailored86 to serve a substantial governmental interest,87 and leave
open ample channels for communication of information.88
84. See Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 536 (“Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, place,
or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.”); Linmark
Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner
of speech stand on a different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether.”); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved
[time, place, and manner] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”).
85. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding time, place, and manner restrictions
placed on a parade license were constitutional because they were based on the city’s legitimate interests
in regulating traffic and securing public order); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949)
(stating the government has a legitimate interest in the “comfort and convenience” of its citizens). Other
examples of time, place, and manner restrictions include Grayned, where the Court upheld a noise
ordinance because it advanced the city’s “interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to
the students’ learning.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119. In Cox v. Louisiana, the Court upheld a ban on street
demonstrations during rush hour since they “might put an intolerable burden on the essential flow of
traffic.” Id. at 115–16 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)). In Kovacs, the Court held the
government could regulate over-amplified loudspeakers. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88–89. In Members of City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court stated the city could
regulate signs on utility poles when it is trying to improve aesthetics and is not suppressing ideas. Id. at
805, 807.
86. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1939) (declaring unconstitutional an
ordinance restricting hand billing on the basis that discarded leaflets would cause litter because there
were alternative means, other than restricting speech, to prevent littering—such as punishing those who
actually threw the leaflets into the street); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen
a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the
tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the
statutory goal.”). But see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (“‘A complete ban
can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately
targeted evil.’” (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988))); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493, 515–16 (1981) (invalidating San Diego’s billboard ordinance saying it was
not an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction because it allowed for some signs, but the
prohibited signs were “banned everywhere and at all times”).
87. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (“As a general
matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a
public forum is a valid governmental objective.”). In Heffron, the Court says the significance of the
governmental interest should be assessed by considering the nature and function of the particular forum.
Id. at 651. Since the small fairgrounds drew large crowds, “the State’s interest in the orderly movement
and control of such an assembly of persons is a substantial consideration.” Id. at 650.
88. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (holding the city’s ordinance which prohibited homeowners from
displaying most types of yard signs was unconstitutional because it did not “leave open ample
alternative channels for communication”). The City of Ladue argued that there were other means
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3. Public Forum Doctrine
Another important analysis involves government action taken as a
proprietor or patron.89 There is a three-part framework for analyzing
First Amendment issues involving government-owned property.90
The Supreme Court categorizes government property in three ways:
(1) as a public forum; (2) as a designated public forum; or (3) as a
non-public forum and applies a different standard of review to each
forum.91
A public forum is government property that has been traditionally
open to expression.92 Parks and streets are examples of traditional
public forums.93 Speech restrictions in these forums are reviewed
available for homeowners to express themselves, including bumper stickers, flyers, etc.; however, the
Court disagreed because yard signs were “venerable” and had “long been an important and distinct
medium of expression,” and therefore, there were no “adequate substitutes . . . for the important medium
of speech that Ladue has closed off.” Id. at 54–56.
89. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (“But it is also
well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and
controls.”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (“It is a long-settled principle that
governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when ‘the governmental
function operating . . . [is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, . . . but, rather, as
proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation[s] . . . .’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
90. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726 (announcing a “tripartite framework” for analyzing First Amendment
issues involving government property).
91. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (identifying the types of public forums); Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983) (stating different standards should be
applied based on the type of property involved). But see U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (noting that being government property does not automatically
open that property to the public).
92. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (stating that public spaces that have “immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, [and] have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions” are considered
traditional public forums).
93. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803–04. Letter boxes and military bases have been excluded from the list
of traditional public forums. See Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 133 (holding that letter boxes were not public
forums); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (discussing military bases). In Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), the Court did not reach the question of
whether an airport is a public forum; however, in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
the Court held that an airport is not a public forum because “the tradition of airport activity does not
demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity,” and there was no
evidence “that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened
by their operators to such activity . . . .” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680.
Furthermore, the Court stated that “[a]s commercial enterprises, airports must provide services attractive
to the marketplace. . . . [And therefore,] an airport terminal [does not have] as a principal purpose
promoting the free exchange of ideas.” Id. at 682 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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using “the highest scrutiny.”94 For content-based exclusions of
speech, the government “must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.”95 Content-neutral restrictions must be “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.”96
The second type of forum is a designated public forum.97 The
government creates these forums by intentionally98 designating a
place or means of communication as a public forum through policy
or practice.99 Further, the government must grant general access to
these forums.100 Like traditional public forums, designated public
forums are subject to strict scrutiny.101 “Reasonable time, place and
manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”102
The Court cautioned, however, that one should not automatically equate airports with other
“transportation nodes.” Id. at 681–82 (“To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers,
therefore, would be a mistake.”).
94. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678.
95. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
96. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132.
97. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803; Perry,
460 U.S. at 45.
98. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction . . .
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”). “The Court has also
examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the
government’s intent.” Id.
99. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (discussing how a state university created a
designated public forum by allowing student groups to use the university’s meeting facilities). But see
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (finding a school’s internal mail system was not a designated public forum
because the school board did not grant general access to this system). In Perry, the school’s mail system
was used by outside groups; however, those groups had to first secure permission from the school
principal, and there was no evidence the system was open for use by the public. Id. at 47. The Court
further stated, “If by policy or by practice the Perry School District has opened its mail system for
indiscriminate use by the general public, then PLEA could justifiably argue a public forum has been
created.” Id. However, even when the state is not required to open the forum, if it does it must adhere to
“the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. at 46.
100. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–47.
101. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678 (“Regulation of [a designated forum]
is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum.”); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990) (“Regulation of speech on property that the Government has
expressly dedicated to speech activity is also examined under strict scrutiny.”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
800 (“[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a
public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest.”).
102. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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The third type of forum is the non-public forum.103 All other types
of public property are categorized as a non-public forum,104 where
the government is allowed to regulate speech.105 “In addition to time,
place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”106
Taken together, categorizing the type of speech involved,
determining the type of forum at issue, and analyzing whether the
government action is content-based comprise the heart of First
Amendment analysis.107
II. DID BART VIOLATE COMMUTERS’ RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH?
A. The BART Shutdown And Protected Forms Of Speech
To determine if BART’s action of disabling cell service was
constitutional, the first inquiry108 is whether No Justice No BART’s
speech is an unprotected form of speech, and the only category of
unprotected speech it might qualify as is speech that constitutes
incitement.109 The Brandenburg test controls the analysis for
incitement cases,110 and it puts forth three requirements: (1) express
advocacy of law violation, (2) an immediate call for law violation,
and (3) a likelihood that the violation will occur.111
103. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 679 (“Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property
must survive only a much more limited review.”); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (stating that in non-public
forums, government action is “examined only for reasonableness”).
106. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
107. See Hudson, supra note 57, at 57.
108. See FARBER, supra note 56, at 14.
109. The incitement standard is derived from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
110. Id. at 447 (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”).
111. Rohr, supra note 70, at 14 (citing Bernard Schwartz’s take on the Brandenburg test in Holmes
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The first Brandenburg element asks whether No Justice No BART
expressly advocated violation of the law.112 California Penal Code
section 640 makes willfully disturbing or willfully blocking others
within a public transportation system an infraction subject to an
administrative penalty, a fine, imprisonment, or both fine and
imprisonment,113 and California Penal Code section 407 defines
unlawful assembly as two or more persons assembled “to do an
unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous
manner.”114 Other related illegal acts include riots and routs.115 No
Justice No BART probably was not advocating for the degree of
force or violence necessary for a violation of the riot or rout
statutes116 because the group’s policy statement says the organization
promotes peaceful, albeit disruptive protests,117 and its recent prior
Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209,
240 (1994)).
112. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added) (describing the standard for incitement as
“use of force or of law violation . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action”); Rohr, supra note 70, at 14.
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 640 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). The statute states:
Any of the acts described in subdivision (d) shall be punishable by a fine . . . by
imprisonment . . . or by both . . . .
....
(d)(1) Willfully disturbing others on or in a system facility or vehicle by engaging in
boisterous or unruly behavior.
....
(4) Willfully blocking the free movement of another person in a system facility or
vehicle. This paragraph shall not be interpreted to affect any lawful activities permitted or
First Amendment rights protected under the laws of this state or applicable federal law
....
....
(e) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a public transportation agency . . . may enact and
enforce an ordinance providing that a person who [willfully disturbed or blocked others]
. . . be afforded an opportunity to complete an administrative process that imposes only
an administrative penalty enforced in a civil proceeding.
Id.
114. Id. § 407.
115. Id. § 408 (“Every person who participates in any rout or unlawful assembly is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”) A riot is an imminent threat to use force or violence by two or more persons and is
punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. Id. §§ 404–05. A rout is an advance to commit a riot and is
considered a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 406 (“Whenever two or more persons, assembled and acting together,
make any attempt or advance toward the commission of an act which would be a riot if actually
committed, such assembly is a rout.”).
116. Threat of force or violence is necessary to violate California’s riot or rout statutes. Id. §§ 404,
406.
117. See Ho, supra note 22 (reporting that a No Justice No BART protest organizer viewed prior
BART protests to be a success because they were “disruptive but peaceful”); Our Strategy, supra note
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protest did not result in this type of violent behavior.118 If the group
was asking protestors to physically disrupt train service,119 this would
be advocating a willful disturbance and an illegal assembly in
violation of California Penal Code sections 407 and 640.120
It is unclear whether Brandenburg’s “lawless action” standard121
includes non-violent misdemeanor conduct. In Terminiello v. City of
Chicago,122 a fighting words case, the Court stated that “freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”123 In Hess v. Indiana,124 the
Court stated that “words could not be punished by the State on the
ground that they had ‘a tendency to lead to violence.’”125 However,
because Terminiello concerned fighting words126 while Hess focused
on imminence,127 the nature of “lawless activity” remains unclear.
Assuming, arguendo, the speech in the planned BART action
advocated lawless activity, the next step is to determine if the lawless
action was imminent.128 The protest was reportedly planned to begin
at 4:30 p.m. on August 11, 2011.129 Unlike Hess, where the protestor
25.
118. Bender, supra note 22 (reporting no injuries or arrests at the July 2011 protest).
119. No Justice No BART protestors engaged in this type of protest on July 3, 2011 when they
physically blocked train doors so train service would be interrupted. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra
note 12. No protestors were arrested at this event. Bender, supra note 22.
120. PENAL §§ 407, 640.
121. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (describing the standard for speech inducing
incitement as “use of force or of law violation . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
122. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
123. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
124. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
125. Id. at 105, 109 (emphasis added) (discussing the case of a protestor who was convicted of
disorderly conduct but primarily focusing on the issue of imminence rather than the nature of the lawless
activity).
126. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3.
127. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105, 109.
128. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added) (describing the standard
for speech inducing incitement as “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . . directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Rohr,
supra note 70, at 14 (stating that the second element in the Brandenburg test is to determine if the
advocacy calls for immediate law violation).
129. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39.
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threatened to conduct his activity at an ambiguous “later” time,130 No
Justice No BART’s actions were planned for a specific time.131 When
BART took action to shut off cell service just before 4:30 p.m.,
BART believed that a protest was imminent, and based on past
experience with this particular group, they anticipated lawless
action.132
However, when BART made the decision to cut the cell service,
the protestors had not arrived at the stations nor had they begun to
communicate about the planned protest.133 BART shut off cell
service preemptively, before protestors even began using their cell
phones to advocate for potential lawless activity at the station.134
There was prior speech on No Justice No BART’s website
advocating for the protest, and the protest may have been imminent;
135
however, the website was not targeted by BART, but rather,
BART officials targeted future potentially inciting speech.136
The last Brandenburg element is whether lawless activity was
likely to occur.137 The protest organizers had engaged in prior
protests at BART stations, including one that occurred the previous
month.138 In that July protest, No Justice No BART participants did
not engage in violence but were disruptive by screaming, blocking
train doors, climbing on top of a train, and protesting in restricted
areas.139 Yet, not all protestors were disruptive; some protestors
peacefully handed out flyers.140 BART reasonably141 thought the
130. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105, 107–09.
131. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39.
132. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that BART turned off phone service at 4:00 p.m.
just prior to the time they believed protestors would arrive at the stations).
133. Elias, supra note 9; Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12; Jonsson, supra note 13.
134. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
135. See BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39.
136. For a discussion of how the Prior Restraints doctrine could potentially apply to this BART
incident, see Spencer, supra note 43, at 780–88. Spencer evaluates several Supreme Court and appellate
cases and suggests that “[t]he government presumptively violates the First Amendment if it prevents
free speech activities prior to any illegal action by demonstrators or before a demonstration poses a clear
and present danger.” Id. at 782.
137. See supra note 128.
138. See Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the No Justice No BART protests on July 11, 2011).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gitlow v. New York presents an early formulation of the clear
and present danger test:
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upcoming protest would resemble No Justice No BART’s prior
demonstration. In the prior demonstration, where BART deployed an
increased security presence, BART did not arrest anyone,142
suggesting it did not perceive the threat to be serious. BART
officials, however, commented negatively on the disruption, saying
that in the future there would be “zero tolerance” for those types of
disruptive activities.143
In anticipation of the protest action, BART completely cut cell
service to its stations, impacting potential protestors as well as all
other passengers in the affected areas.144 Whether or not the protest
participants’ future speech was within a protected category, BART
also eliminated cell service to passengers at the platforms. The
protestors were only a small portion of all people using BART’s cell
signal,145 and there is no evidence that the other passengers’ speech
was within one of the unprotected categories of speech.
BART eliminated cell service preemptively to remove the threat
that future speech would aid an imminent and potentially disruptive
protest.146 If that speech was found to be part of an unprotected class,
it would not be subject to First Amendment protection147 unless the

[T]he immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given
utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. . . . [T]he State is [not] acting arbitrarily or
unreasonably when . . . it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). However, Spencer suggests that BART’s actions were
unreasonable because BART “impermissibly based its decision on the fact that violence had previously
occurred during a protest of the same nature.” Spencer, supra note 43, at 785. For this proposition,
Spencer cites Collins v. Jordan. Id. at 783. “As a matter of law . . . the occurrence of limited violence
and disorder on one day is not a justification for banning all demonstrations, peaceful and otherwise, on
the immediately following day (or for an indefinite period thereafter).” Id. (quoting Collins v. Jordan,
110 F.3d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1996)).
142. See Bender, supra note 22.
143. Ho, supra note 22 (quoting a BART spokesman who said, “That delay goes to the protesters . . . .
That mess, those fringe groups own it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
145. See generally Cabanatuan, supra note 49 (discussing BART’s wireless coverage). In the July
2011 protest there were only about 100 protestors compared with the approximately 335,000 patrons
that used the stations daily in 2010. BART Fiscal Year Weekday Average Exits, BART,
http://www.bart.gov/docs/FY11_Average_Weekday_Exits.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); Ho, supra
note 22.
146. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
147. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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court found BART’s actions were content-based.148 However, it
seems more likely the speech was within a protected class. Therefore,
the next step would be to subject BART’s actions to forum and
content discrimination analyses.149
B. BART’s Cell Phone Service And BART Platforms: A Multiple
Forum Analysis
The fact the speech restriction occurred on BART property using
BART cell signals—both government property—requires a forum
analysis to determine whether BART is a public forum, designated
public forum, or non-public forum.150 The BART stations are not
traditional public forums because the Court has limited those to
streets and parks—places traditionally open to expression.151 Further,
like Perry,152 BART did not grant general access to the paid areas of
its platforms, so those areas would not be designated public
forums.153 It does not matter that BART allowed protests to occur
inside the paid areas because a government must intentionally open
the forum.154 Therefore, because the platforms were non-public
forums,155 BART’s decision to shut down cell service in the paid
areas would likely be found constitutional, so long as the decision
was not content-based.156
148. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (stating that unprotected speech can be afforded
First Amendment protections if the censorship is content-based).
149. See supra notes 74, 90 and accompanying text.
150. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
151. Id. at 802.
152. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
153. Id. at 45, 47 (stating that there was no evidence the system was open for use by the general
public—so it was not a public forum); see also Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (describing
BART’s policy of allowing protest activities only in specified non-paid areas of its stations). The nonpaid areas of the stations, unlike the paid areas, may be considered designated public forums because
BART had a policy of allowing access to the general public.
154. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Further, BART did not have a policy of allowing protestors to use
the paid areas of their stations, as did the University in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).
155. All other types of public property, other than those falling within the public and designated
public forums, are considered non-public forums. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).
156. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The Court has considered safety concerns significant governmental
interests; therefore, BART’s safety justification would likely meet the lower standard of reasonableness.
See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981).
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A forum, however, is not limited to tangible property, so
alternately, BART’s cell signals could be considered the applicable
forum.157 BART’s provision of cell phone signals could be
considered a forum because the protestors were seeking to use the
signals to organize their protest.158 If BART’s cell service was the
forum, it would likely be a designated public forum159 because
BART intentionally made its cell service publicly accessible to
anyone with the equipment to use the service.160
Assuming, arguendo, that BART’s cell service is a designated
public forum, then the standard of review would depend on the
outcome of a content discrimination analysis.161
C. The Content Discrimination Debate
The final phase of this constitutional analysis is to determine
whether the decision to cut cell phone service was content-based or
content-neutral and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.162 No
Justice No BART contends the reason BART cut off cell service was
to stop a high profile, planned protest about the conduct of BART’s
own police force, which supports an argument that it was a contentbased restriction.163 BART, on the other hand, contends that,
although the cell phone shutdown targeted the protestors, BART’s
157. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[I]n defining the forum we have focused on the access sought
by the speaker.”). In Cornelius, the forum was determined to be a fundraising campaign, not the
government building. Id. at 801. In Perry, the forum was defined as a school’s internal mail system and
not the school building. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
158. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that protestors planned to use cell service
within the station to coordinate the protest).
159. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing the designated public forum).
160. Cabanatuan, supra note 49 (discussing BART’s wireless coverage); Wireless Connections, supra
note 11. The cell service would likely not be considered a traditional public forum due to the lack of
tradition generally associated with new technologies. Some authors have proposed expanding or
modernizing the traditional public forum to include technological or “virtual” forums. E.g., Fleming,
supra note 21, at 652–61; Lackert, supra note 21, at 596–98.
161. In designated public forums, the standard for content-based exclusions of speech is a compelling
state interest with action “narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. Contentneutral actions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels for communication.” Id. at 800 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
162. See Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 53 (“Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the
application of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”).
163. See Response to BART’s Illegal Blackout of Phone Service, supra note 44.
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decision to cut cell service was motivated by a concern for the safety,
welfare, and convenience of their passengers.164 This supports the
theory that it was a content-neutral action.
A government law or action is generally deemed content-based if it
is restricted because of its subject matter or viewpoint.165 On its face,
BART’s actions appear to be content-neutral because BART shut off
cell service to everyone on the platforms.166 Although BART shut off
cell service to all passengers, they only cut the service for a limited
time period and at limited locations corresponding to the time and
places of No Justice No BART’s planned protest.167 This type of
targeted action is similar to Police Department v. Mosley, where the
Supreme Court overturned a Chicago ordinance allowing peaceful
picketing for some groups but not for others.168 In contrast, in Hill v.
Colorado, the Supreme Court stated that a government action does
not become an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech
simply because it is applied “to the specific locations where [that]
discourse occurs.”169 However, unlike Hill v. Colorado, BART did
not restrict cell service only during regular peak rush hours; they
specifically turned it off on one occasion because they believed No
Justice No BART would be present.170
Even if BART’s decision to cut cell service is considered contentbased, the secondary effects doctrine would likely apply.171 Like City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. and Boos v. Barry,172 BART
164. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (citing safety concerns over potential falls from
overcrowded platforms near an electrified third rail and safety concerns posed by trains stopped in
tunnels).
165. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
166. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
167. See id. BART representatives state their actions were aimed at this particular group’s activities.
See id.
168. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
169. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) (alteration in original) (discussing that a statute
making it illegal to approach within eight feet of another health care facility was not a content-based
law). The Court also gave an example of this principle. Id. “A statute prohibiting solicitation in airports
that was motivated by the aggressive approaches of Hare Krishnas does not become content based solely
because its application is confined to airports . . . .” Id.
170. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
171. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
172. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (suggesting that if the contested content-based
regulations had been justified by concerns about congestion, interference with ingress or egress, visual
clutter, or security, the secondary effects doctrine may have applied); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47
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representatives say their shutdown of service was not due to the
message but the effects of the protest organized by the restricted
speech.173 BART clearly states that its concern was the safety of its
passengers and the orderly functioning of its transportation system,
although some internal e-mail exchanges may belie that
contention.174 Therefore, it is more likely that the Court would
consider BART’s action to fall within the secondary effects doctrine,
meaning it would be scrutinized as if it were a content-neutral
action.175
If the cell phone shutdown is deemed content-neutral, BART can
place reasonable176 time, place, and manner restrictions on the
speech.177 Like Grayned, BART’s decision to shut down cell service
(holding that the location of adult theatres could be restricted because these restrictions targeted the
secondary effects of the theatre on the community—such as increased crime—and not the actual content
of the adult films).
173. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
174. See id.; Elinson, supra note 43; Spencer, supra note 43. For a discussion of how BART’s
internal communications could be the deciding factor in a court finding that BART’s actions were
content-based, see Spencer, supra note 43, at 778–79. This note gives more weight to BART’s official
statements because they invoke a safety rationale. “As applied by lower courts in recent years, the
already watered-down requirements of content neutrality and narrow tailoring have been strained to the
point of breaking under the weight of the government’s post-Seattle, post-9/11 security interest.” Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1267
(2008). “Temporary regulations enacted in the name of security are the real-world equivalents of getout-of-jail-free cards for governments seeking to restrict protest.” Id. at 1259. “Time and again, judges
have simply credited governments’ arguments that enjoyed social currency as justifications for
restrictions on speech, rather than pressing the government to prove the truth of those assertions.” Id. at
1258.
175. If, arguendo, BART’s action was considered content-based, the Court would review it using
strict scrutiny: the government action must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. See
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). BART stated that its actions were based
on ensuring the safety of its passengers, and the Court has viewed a threat to public safety as a
compelling interest. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Franklin & Wakeman,
supra note 12 (discussing the hazards at the stations). The cell phone shutdown must also be narrowly
tailored to meet that compelling safety interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
It is unclear if BART’s actions were sufficiently tailored to meet this compelling interest. See infra notes
186–91 and accompanying text.
176. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (stating the reasonableness of the
restrictions is based on “[t]he nature of a place, [and] the pattern of its normal activities,” and the
essential inquiry is “whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time”).
177. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (“Therefore, a
constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content
or subject matter of speech.”); Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)
(“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on a different footing from laws
prohibiting speech altogether.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
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advances its interests in having safe and orderly transit stations.178
Also, like Cox v. Louisiana, BART’s actions to shut down cell
service stopped a protest that might have caused serious system-wide
disruption to transit schedules.179 In addition, the shutdown only
lasted four hours and was restricted to the platform areas of the
concourse where safety issues are highest.180 BART’s restrictions,
therefore, appear reasonable.
BART’s time, place, and manner restrictions must also be
narrowly tailored181 to serve a substantial governmental interest,182
and leave open ample channels for communication of information.183
The Court has frequently said that public safety, order, and
convenience are substantial governmental interests.184 BART
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [time, place, and manner] restrictions . . . provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”). But see Fleming, supra note 21, at 648 (citing Madsen v.
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) for the proposition that “when the regulation is
only temporary in nature, designed specifically to address an immediate issue and not to set a standard
that will apply to all speakers in the future, as in the BART situation, the intermediate scrutiny of the
reasonable time, place, and manner test should not be applicable and a more searching level should be
applied”). However, the Court in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. was discussing the differences
in standards relating to a statutory prohibition versus an injunction, and therefore, it is not directly on
point with the BART cell service shutdown. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
763–65 (1994).
178. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (upholding a noise ordinance because it advanced the city’s “interest
in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students’ learning”).
179. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115–16 (“A
demonstration or parade on a large street during rush hour might put an intolerable burden on the
essential flow of traffic . . . .”).
180. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
181. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen a content-neutral regulation does not
entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it
is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”). But see Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (“‘A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity
within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.’” (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 485 (1988))).
182. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (“As a general
matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a
public forum is a valid governmental objective.”). In Heffron, the Court found that the significance of
the governmental interest should be assessed by considering the nature and function of the particular
forum. Id. at 651. Since the small fairgrounds drew large crowds, “the State’s interest in the orderly
movement and control of such an assembly is a substantial consideration.” Id. at 641.
183. See supra note 88.
184. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949) (stating the
government has a legitimate interest in the “comfort and convenience” of its citizens); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding that time, place, and manner restrictions placed on a
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likewise justifies its actions by citing concerns for safety and
order.185
Narrow tailoring would present a larger issue for BART. BART’s
actions impacted more than just the protestors.186 Ward v. Rock
Against Racism suggests that BART’s sweeping actions of cutting
cell service to everyone on the platforms would not be properly
tailored because the shutdown affected regular speech that was not
“an appropriately targeted evil.”187 Furthermore, because this was a
complete shutdown of service on the platform levels,188 it should be
the least restrictive means of achieving BART’s goals of safety,
order, and convenience.189 In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court said
the least restrictive means to prevent littering from flyer distribution
was not to ban the flyers but to punish those who threw the litter in
the street.190 BART could deploy additional police officers, as they
did during the prior demonstration, and punish those who become
disruptive, which they did not do during the prior protest.191
However, an alternative interpretation would be that because BART
was concerned about the safety effects the future speech would
cause, BART’s actions were narrowly tailored since it only targeted
speech.
Most importantly, BART must have left open ample channels for
communication of information.192 BART shut down its cell signal,
parade license were constitutional because they were based on the city’s legitimate interests in
regulating traffic and securing public order).
185. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
186. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
187. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Service to
customers, who were not protestors, was also disrupted; regular speech impacted by this broad action
could have included health care practitioners checking on patients, employees engaging in work-related
activities, or just friends and family staying in touch with each other. See Fleming, supra note 21, at
645.
188. It could also be argued that this was not a complete shutdown because cell service was still
available on the street level. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. In Heffron, the Court said that the
decision to set aside a certain area of the fair for distribution of information was not a total ban because
the distributors were “not secreted away in some nonaccessible location, but [were] located within the
area of the fairgrounds where visitors are expected, and indeed encouraged, to pass.” Heffron, 452 U.S.
at 655 n.16. This regulation fixed the location but was not a total ban. Id.
189. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000).
190. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1939).
191. See Bender, supra note 22.
192. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45–46, 58, 56 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
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but cell service was not completely unavailable at the stations. Cell
service was available at street level.193 BART also made intercom
service and courtesy phones available to passengers.194 Ultimately,
however, the available means of communication either did not
connect to the internet or did not allow the user to communicate with
multiple persons at once while actively commuting and, therefore, do
not seem to be effective substitutes for the type of service BART
eliminated.
It is questionable, however, whether courts consider cell service to
be an irreplaceable means of communication. In Gilleo, the city
banned most yard signs arguing that there were other forms of
communication homeowners could use to express themselves, but the
Court disagreed because yard signs were a distinct, “venerable,” and
“long . . . important” form of expression without adequate
substitutes.195 The Court’s description of what constitutes an
irreplaceable method of communication is a crucial point. Cell
service is an increasingly important medium of communication,196
but whether a court would consider cell phone communication—
digital speech—to be a distinct, “venerable,” and “long . . .
important” form of expression is unclear.197
A final public policy consideration is whether viewing BART’s
actions as unconstitutional would have a chilling effect on
government entities providing public access to cell service. If a
government feared legal action from shutting down its cell signal, it
might not be inclined to make similar future resource allocations.
A court would likely find BART’s actions constitutional if the
potential cell communications were considered incitement or if the
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The California Supreme Court observed:
[T]he disconnection of telephones not only may deprive the subscriber of the monetary
value of his economic venture, but in such circumstances denies him an essential means
of communication for which there is no effective substitute. Hence, this restraint upon
communication by the subscriber also affects his right of free speech as guaranteed by the
First Amendment of the federal Constitution.
Sokol v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 265, 270 (Cal. 1966).
193. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12.
194. Id.
195. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 45–46, 58, 56 (citing other means, such as bumper stickers and flyers).
196. See supra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text.
197. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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forum was the BART station itself rather than the cell signal because
there would be either no protection for the speech or a lower standard
of review for BART to meet.198 If the forum was the cell signal itself,
then BART’s actions would be subject to increased levels of
scrutiny.199 The crux is whether the complete shutdown of cell
service was sufficiently tailored to meet BART’s interests in safety
and order and whether BART left open ample alternative channels of
communication.200
III. THE NEED TO FIND ALTERNATE SOURCES OF PROTECTION FOR
DIGITAL SPEECH
The August 11, 2011 BART incident201 was not the only attempt
by a government entity in the United States to restrict digital speech.
Although ultimately vetoed by the mayor, the Cleveland city council
passed an ordinance making the use of social media in certain
circumstances a misdemeanor.202 The United States Congress also
proposed legislation in 2010 that would have allowed the government
to manage cybertechnology, including telecommunications, in the
event of a national security threat.203 In 2012, the Georgia General
Assembly introduced a resolution that urged the United States
198. See supra notes 146–48, 151–56 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 157–61.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 184–85, 192–97.
201. See discussion supra Part I.B.
202. See Ordinance No. 1012-11, ACLU OHIO (July 21, 2011), http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues
/FreeSpeech/CityOfClevelandSocialMediaOrdinance2011_0725.pdf (stating that passage of the
proposed ordinance would add a new section to the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland, which
would say, “(a) No person shall use social media to induce persons to commit . . . Disorderly Conduct;
Intoxication, and/or . . . Unlawful Congregation; (b) Whoever violates this section is guilty of improper
use of social media, a minor misdemeanor . . . .”); Thomas Ott, Cleveland City Council Upholds Mayor
Frank Jackson’s Veto on Flash Mobs, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 18, 2011, 7:28 AM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/08/cleveland_council_upholds_jack.html
(discussing
the
Cleveland city council’s decision not to override the mayor’s veto of the social media legislation).
203. See generally S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010); Denis Binder, Steven Burns & Jeffrey H. Wood,
Homeland Security: 2010 Annual Report, 2010 A.B.A. ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV.
361 (discussing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 (S. 3480), which would
“create a White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to lead federal and private sector efforts to secure
critical cyber networks and assets.”). This legislation is sometimes referred to as the internet “kill
switch” legislation. See Bob Barr, Big Brother’s Cell Phone “Kill Switch,” ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug.
22, 2011), http://blogs.ajc.com/bob-barr-blog/?s=BART&x=0&y=0.
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Congress to “amend the Communications Act of 1934 and FCC rules
so as to permit the use of ‘cellular jammers’ to prevent illegal cell
phone use in prison facilities; and for other purposes.”204 With
increasing use of digital methods of speech, accompanied by
increasing attempts to regulate it,205 more conflict between
governmental actions and the First Amendment is likely. There are
four sources of law that can address these potential conflicts. These
include constitutional protections as interpreted by the Supreme
Court,
individual
state
constitutional
protections,
the
Communications Act of 1934, and other government legislation.
However, because the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this
issue and state supreme court decisions can vary across the country,
relying on courts to interpret First Amendment rights in ways that
protect this new digital speech206 would be reactive and
unpredictable. Instead, this Note suggests creating new laws or
policies that proactively set rules to guide governments’ decisionmaking processes.
A. The Supreme Court’s View Of Digital Speech And New
Technologies
As seen in the analysis of the BART incident, a government’s
traditional safety interests and the need to leave open alternative
means of communication are important elements207 of a free speech
204. H.R. 1325, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012). The resolution passed the Georgia House
of Representatives on February 16, 2012. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, H.R. 1325
(Feb. 16, 2012).
205. Restricting digital speech can be a very attractive and efficient means for the government to
provide a quick resolution to a perceived issue because these new technologies are able to reach a large
number of people and because they can be controlled, seemingly, by the flip of a switch. See supra note
16. BART’s decision to shut off cell phone service was done by turning power off to the cell nodes. See
supra note 47. This was an effective tool since the protest never materialized. See Elias, supra note 9;
Jonsson, supra note 13.
206. To protect emerging digital technologies, some scholars have proposed that the Supreme Court
adopt a virtual or modern forum as part of its First Amendment jurisprudence. See Fleming, supra note
21; Lackert, supra note 21.
207. The First Amendment issues would be reduced to whether the action or regulation by the
government was narrowly tailored to meet the government’s traditional and legitimate interests in safety
or security while leaving open ample alternative channels for communication. See Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 181–95.
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analysis. In future conflicts, how individual fact situations affect
these elements will be a large component of the outcomes, but the
crucial, yet undetermined, issue in any future case would ultimately
turn on the Court’s view of technology.208
Prior Court statements about how to apply the First Amendment to
new technologies are conflicting.209 Justice Scalia articulated a
traditional approach in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association: “[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution
to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not
vary’ when a new and different medium for communication
appears.”210 One First Amendment principle is that when the
government restricts an entire medium of speech, it must “leave open
ample alternative channels for communication.”211 The Court has
stated that there are no adequate substitutes when the restricted
speech is a “venerable,” “long . . . important,” and “distinct” method
of communication.212 Given the recent appearance of digital
communications,213 it is unclear whether this form of communication
qualifies. Therefore, if the Court applies First Amendment principles
that favor more traditional forms of communications, obtaining free
speech protection for new technologies may be difficult.
208. The crucial concern is the existence of adequate alternatives, which depend on the Court’s view
of cell technology. See supra text accompanying notes 192–97.
209. Compare Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)), with Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981). Yet, some scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court has already
“recognized the inimitable nature of [internet speech].” Wiebe, supra note 21, at 217. The Court has also
begun to address new technology in relation to the Fourth Amendment. See Fleming, supra note 21, at
654–57. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring), Justice Alito “criticized the majority for applying antiquated law to twenty-first century
surveillance techniques.” Fleming, supra note 21, at 656. Justice Alito also stated that legislatures are
better equipped than courts to “gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012);
see also Fleming, supra note 21, at 656.
210. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
211. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45–46, 58, 56 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
212. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54–55 (stating there were no adequate alternatives to yard signs).
213. See generally The Changes to Mobile Phones over the Last 30 Years, THE PEOPLE HISTORY,
http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/mobilephones.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (discussing the history
of cell phones and their increased growth over the past three decades).
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In contrast to Justice Scalia’s traditional approach to new
technologies articulated in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,214 the Court in Metromedia stated, “This Court has often
faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First
Amendment to unique forums of expression. . . . Each method of
communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect
the ‘differing natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each
method.”215 The Metromedia approach to technology is more modern
and would be more likely to take into consideration qualities of
digital speech beyond whether it was “venerable” or traditional.216
The nature of digital speech allows for a variety of communications
to take place all in one smartphone.217 In the past, this range of
communications could only be provided by several separate speech
methods.218 Posting opinions and commentary to a social media site,
distributing communication and meeting information between likeminded individuals via electronic mail, Twitter, Facebook, instant
messaging, and website updating can replicate the function of yard
signs, billboards, public speeches, printed newsletters, and other
means of expressing thoughts to others. The widespread adoption,
speed of message delivery, and variety of applications makes this
method of communication, while novel, irreplaceable.219
However, until the Court decides digital speech has attained
“venerable” status, other forms of protection may be necessary.220

214. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
215. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
216. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54–55.
217. See supra notes 1, 16.
218. See supra notes 1, 15–16 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
220. Some scholars have suggested that new technologies should be integrated into First Amendment
jurisprudence by amending the public forum analysis to include a “virtual” or “modern” public forum
that would be subject to the heightened scrutiny of the traditional public forum. Marvin Ammori, The
Year in “First Amendment Architecture,” 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 6, 19–20 (2012); Fleming, supra
note 21, at 652–61; Lackert, supra note 21, at 596–98. Due to the uncertainty in how the Supreme Court
may approach digital speech, this Note proposes other methods of protecting digital speech.
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B. State Constitutional Protections
If the Court does not account for digital speech’s unique attributes,
then protection for digital speech must come from sources other than
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. State
constitutions are a potential source of protection. State constitutions
can be more protective of rights but cannot be less protective than the
United States Constitution.221
California’s constitution has its own free speech clause,222 which
California courts have interpreted in ways that differ from the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment.223 For
example, in Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission,224 the state
supreme court said that telephones were “essential” means of
communication without “effective substitute.”225 If telephone service
is viewed in this manner, then digital telephone technologies, which
appear similar, should receive stronger protections under the state
free speech guarantee. In addition, California has interpreted forum
requirements differently, finding train stations to be traditional public
forums.226 Accordingly, speech in the BART incident would receive
greater protection regardless of whether the forum was determined to
be the cell service or the station—a consideration in the BART
incident.227 Finally, a California court has said that a telephone
company cannot turn off service because it thinks that customers may
be using the service to transmit information allowing someone to
221. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81(1980) (finding a state has the authority to
“exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution”).
222. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”).
223. Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The California Constitution
provides protections for speakers in some respects broader than provided by the First Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”); see also letter from Michael T. Risher, ACLU Staff Attorney, to S.F. Bay Area
Rapid Transit Bd. Of Dirs. (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/aclu_letter_to_bart_
board_of_directors_aug_22_2011.pdf.
224. Sokol v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1966).
225. Id. at 270.
226. E.g., In re Hoffman, 434 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1967) (finding that train stations are traditional public
forums). See generally letter from Michael T. Risher, supra note 223 (discussing Hoffman and other
examples).
227. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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violate the law.228 Because California courts have addressed free
speech elements differently than the Supreme Court, California has
provided stronger protections for digital speech. In particular, by
deciding that there are no effective alternatives to telephones, which
are closely related to mobile phones, California’s courts have filled a
void in this area of Supreme Court jurisprudence.229
C. The Communications Act Of 1934
If a state did not provide increased free speech protection, federal
laws could potentially afford some legal protection against a
government action restricting digital speech. The FCC prohibits
jamming of cell technologies under the Communications Act of
1934,230 but the statute was inapplicable because BART did not jam
cell signals but, rather, turned power off to its cell nodes.231 BART or
any other cellular provider may also be subject to 47 U.S.C. § 214(a),
which mandates that an entity “impair[ing]” cell service to a
community must first obtain an FCC certification stating the action
will not inconvenience the public.232 The statute makes an exception
for emergencies, but a party must still make a request prior to the
action.233 Because this law takes the public inconvenience of a cell
phone shutdown into consideration, it could protect the public’s
228. See letter from Michael T. Risher, supra note 223. The California District Court of Appeals
stated:
The telephone company has no more right to refuse its facilities to persons because of a
belief that such persons will use such service to transmit information that may enable
recipients thereof to violate the law than a railroad company would have to refuse to
carry persons on its trains because those in charge of the train believed that the purpose of
the persons so transported in going to a certain point was to commit an offense.
People v. Brophy, 120 P.2d 946, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 195–97.
230. 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
231. See supra note 47.
232. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006).
233. Id. (making an exception when an entity requests and the FCC “authorize[s] [a] temporary or
emergency discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, or partial discontinuance, reduction, or
impairment of service, without regard to the provisions of this section”). The FCC investigated the
BART incident. Daniel B. Wood, BART Puts Social Media Crackdown in ‘Uncharted’ Legal Territory,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16237522 (discussing the statement
issued by the FCC that said it was investigating “the important issues . . . including public safety and
ensuring the availability of communications networks.”).
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speech rights if a government contemplates restricting cell service
because of the actions of a small group of users. However, the
problem with this law lies in its emergency exception. This exception
gives the FCC great discretion to balance public inconvenience
against an emergency. Because a government’s safety interests have
long been considered significant,234 this balance would likely tip
toward the government’s action, and the regulation would not
provide protection for the technology user.
D. Other Legislation Or Policies
Potential digital speech safeguards include the reactionary
protections provided by the Supreme Court and state constitutions
and the current weak FCC statutes. Therefore, Congress or state
governments should enact legislation or policies that protect digital
speech before it is violated—proactive protection.235 New legislation
or policies should address the seemingly unlimited discretion that
government officials now have by invoking security concerns to
address perceived threats from digital technologies and should
impose procedures for determining when shutdowns are appropriate.
Admittedly, given the security threats that exist in the post-9/11
world, this would be a difficult line to draw, but there is an
appreciable difference between security threats that entail a sevenminute average train delay236 and ones that involve terrorists using
cell signals to detonate a bomb.237 There are precedents for imposing
234. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note
174.
235. In early 2012, “a California state senator introduced a bill that would require a magistrate order
to effectuate a wireless service interruption, and a Chicago alderman proposed an ordinance that would
restrict the ability of law enforcement officer to interrupt wireless service.” FED. COMMC’N COMM’N,
COMMISSION SEEKS COMMENT ON CERTAIN WIRELESS SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS 2 n.6 (2012), available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/commission-seeks-comment-certain-wireless-service-interruptions;
Don Babwin, Chicago Asked Not to Stifle Wireless at Summits, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 15,
2012, 4:20 PM), available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9SU230O0.htm.
236. See supra text accompanying note 34.
237. See Christina Mendez, ‘Cell Phone Set Off Bomb,’ PHILSTAR.COM, (Jan. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/651437/cell-phone-set-bomb (describing an incident where a bomb
was triggered by a cell phone). On March 1, 2012, the FCC issued a public notice stating that the FCC
was “seek[ing] comment on concerns and issues related to intentional interruptions of [wireless service]
by government authorities for the purpose of ensuring public safety.” FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra
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such procedures. Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934
gives the President of the United States authority to shut down
wireless communications during war or the threat of war.238 This Act
would not have been applicable in the BART incident, but it is an
example of giving the government the ability to take action in a
defined circumstance.239 In addition, in December 2011, BART
adopted a new “cell service interruption policy.”240 This policy
outlines the necessary steps to be taken before an interruption can be
enacted and states that cell phone service can only be interrupted
under “extraordinary circumstances.”241 Significantly, the policy
provides examples of extraordinary circumstances: (1) evidence of
use of cell phones “as instrumentalities in explosives;” (2) “to
facilitate violent criminal activity;” or (3) “to facilitate specific plans
or attempts to destroy District property or substantially disrupt public
transit services.”242 The federal government, states, municipalities, or
other public entities should consider passing similar legislation or
policies that detail when and how the decision to discontinue cell
service should be made. This would provide a procedural hurdle to
note 235, at 1. The public notice stated that the FCC was “focused on situations where one or more
wireless carriers, or their authorized agents, interrupt their own services in an area for a limited time
period at the request of a government actor, or have their services interrupted by a government actor that
exercises lawful control over network faculties.” Id. at 2. The FCC further stated that “[a]ny intentional
interruption of wireless service, no matter how brief or localized, raises significant concerns and
implicates substantial legal and policy questions.” Id.
238. 47 U.S.C. § 606(d) (2006) (stating that the president has the authority to “cause the closing of
any facility or station for wire communication and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and
equipment”).
239. The Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 is an example of a bill that does not
adequately limit discretion. See, e.g., S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010). It allows the federal government to
impact cellular service except when there is an undefined “threat.” Id.
240. Extraordinary Circumstances Only for Cell Phone Interruptions, BART (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20111201.aspx; Michael Cabanatuan, BART Cell Phone
Shutdown Rules Adopted, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 2, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/
BART-cell-phone-shutdown-rules-adopted-2344326.php. Reportedly, the FCC reviewed BART’s draft
policy and made suggestions for the final policy document. See id. The FCC made the following public
comment regarding BART’s cell service interruption policy: “Today BART took an important step in
responding to legitimate concerns raised by its August 11, 2011 interruption of wireless service. As the
policy BART adopted recognizes, communication networks that are open and available are critical to
our democracy and economy.” FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s Statement on BART Policy
Adoption, FCC (Dec. 1, 2012), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-311310A1.pdf.
241. Cell Service Interruption Policy, BART, http://www.bart.gov/docs/final_CSIP.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2012).
242. Id.
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and some accountability on a government official’s ability to disrupt
an important First Amendment right.
Creating legislation or new policies that consider the unique and
important features of digital speech could provide protection for
digital speech that is currently lacking under the somewhat muddled
state of First Amendment law.
CONCLUSION
BART’s shut down of cell service on August 11, 2011 was a novel
exercise of government power over free speech.243 BART, as owner
of the cell service, shut down speech in anticipation of certain actions
that the future speech might provoke.244 Although BART had
legitimate safety interests in protecting its passengers, shutting down
an entire, unique means of communication impacted more people
than just the protestors.245 This incident highlights the inadequacies
of the Supreme Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence when
applied to a situation involving digital technologies.246 If the Court
applied its traditional free speech principles247 to the BART incident,
whether No Justice No BART’s speech constituted unprotected
incitement and whether the forum was the BART station or the cell
service are unclear.248 Assuming the actions were not incitement and
the forum was the cell service, BART’s actions could be considered
content-neutral and receive a level of scrutiny that pits BART’s
significant safety interests against the availability of alternate means
of communication.249 How the Court views digital speech is an
important, but unknown, factor in the ultimate outcome.250
Today, people use smartphones as a kind of mobile printing press.
They allow an increasing number of users to communicate widely
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.A–B.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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and instantaneously.251 This widespread and rapid dissemination of
ideas provides a means for people to peacefully express their views
or to organize rallies, but it also provides means for others to threaten
security on a much wider scale. Therefore, there needs to be a careful
balancing of free speech rights against public safety concerns—one
that involves accounting for the uniqueness and importance of this
method of communication. Because the Court may employ a
traditional application of First Amendment tests, digital speech may
not be adequately protected. Until digital speech attains “venerable”
status, it is necessary to enact proactive protections at the federal or
state level. The use of social media and emerging technologies
continue to increase; therefore, the law needs to address the
complicated issues arising from these new means of digital speech.

251. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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